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🚨 [security] Update express 4.17.1 → 4.21.2 (minor) #34

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🚨 [security] Update express 4.17.1 → 4.21.2 (minor) #34

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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ express (4.17.1 → 4.21.2) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 express vulnerable to XSS via response.redirect()

Impact

In express <4.20.0, passing untrusted user input - even after sanitizing it - to response.redirect() may execute untrusted code

Patches

this issue is patched in express 4.20.0

Workarounds

users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched version of express, but otherwise can workaround this issue by making sure any untrusted inputs are safe, ideally by validating them against an explicit allowlist

Details

successful exploitation of this vector requires the following:

  1. The attacker MUST control the input to response.redirect()
  2. express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears
  3. the browser MUST NOT complete redirection before:
  4. the user MUST click on the link in the template

🚨 Express.js Open Redirect in malformed URLs

Impact

Versions of Express.js prior to 4.19.2 and pre-release alpha and beta versions before 5.0.0-beta.3 are affected by an open redirect vulnerability using malformed URLs.

When a user of Express performs a redirect using a user-provided URL Express performs an encode using encodeurl on the contents before passing it to the location header. This can cause malformed URLs to be evaluated in unexpected ways by common redirect allow list implementations in Express applications, leading to an Open Redirect via bypass of a properly implemented allow list.

The main method impacted is res.location() but this is also called from within res.redirect().

Patches

0867302
0b74695

An initial fix went out with [email protected], we then patched a feature regression in 4.19.1 and added improved handling for the bypass in 4.19.2.

Workarounds

The fix for this involves pre-parsing the url string with either require('node:url').parse or new URL. These are steps you can take on your own before passing the user input string to res.location or res.redirect.

References

#5539
koajs/koa#1800
https://expressjs.com/en/4x/api.html#res.location

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ accepts (indirect, 1.3.7 → 1.3.8) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.3.8

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ content-disposition (indirect, 0.5.3 → 0.5.4) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.5.4

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Commits

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↗️ cookie (indirect, 0.4.0 → 0.7.1) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 cookie accepts cookie name, path, and domain with out of bounds characters

Impact

The cookie name could be used to set other fields of the cookie, resulting in an unexpected cookie value. For example, serialize("userName=<script>alert('XSS3')</script>; Max-Age=2592000; a", value) would result in "userName=<script>alert('XSS3')</script>; Max-Age=2592000; a=test", setting userName cookie to <script> and ignoring value.

A similar escape can be used for path and domain, which could be abused to alter other fields of the cookie.

Patches

Upgrade to 0.7.0, which updates the validation for name, path, and domain.

Workarounds

Avoid passing untrusted or arbitrary values for these fields, ensure they are set by the application instead of user input.

References

Release Notes

0.7.1

Fixed

  • Allow leading dot for domain (#174)
    • Although not permitted in the spec, some users expect this to work and user agents ignore the leading dot according to spec
  • Add fast path for serialize without options, use obj.hasOwnProperty when parsing (#172)

v0.7.0...v0.7.1

0.7.0

v0.6.0...v0.7.0

0.6.0 (from changelog)

  • Add partitioned option

0.5.0

  • Add priority option
  • Fix expires option to reject invalid dates
  • pref: improve default decode speed
  • pref: remove slow string split in parse

0.4.2

  • pref: read value only when assigning in parse
  • pref: remove unnecessary regexp in parse

0.4.1

  • Fix maxAge option to reject invalid values

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ destroy (indirect, 1.0.4 → 1.2.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.2.0 (from changelog)

  • Add suppress argument

1.1.1 (from changelog)

  • Work around Zlib close bug in Node.js < 4.5.5

1.1.0 (from changelog)

  • Add Zlib steam support and Node.js leak work around

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ encodeurl (indirect, 1.0.2 → 2.0.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.0.0

Changed

  • Align encoding with WHATWG URL spec (#8) be0f77b
    • Stops encoding \, ^, and |.

Important: If you are using this to encode user entered and validated URLs, upgrade to v2 immediately. It is possible to exploit \ encoding in v1. A URL can be formed that looks like http://foo.com\@bar.com, which parses as foo.com for the host, but when encodeUrl(url) will parse as bar.com for the host.

v1.0.2...v2.0.0

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Commits

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↗️ finalhandler (indirect, 1.1.2 → 1.3.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.2.1 (from changelog)

  • Gracefully handle when handling an error and socket is null

1.2.0

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Commits

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↗️ forwarded (indirect, 0.1.2 → 0.2.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.2.0

  • Use req.socket over deprecated req.connection

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ merge-descriptors (indirect, 1.0.1 → 1.0.3) · Repo · Changelog

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ negotiator (indirect, 0.6.2 → 0.6.3) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.6.3 (from changelog)

  • Revert "Lazy-load modules from main entry point"

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ path-to-regexp (indirect, 0.1.7 → 0.1.12) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Unpatched `path-to-regexp` ReDoS in 0.1.x

Impact

The regular expression that is vulnerable to backtracking can be generated in the 0.1.x release of path-to-regexp, originally reported in CVE-2024-45296

Patches

Upgrade to 0.1.12.

Workarounds

Avoid using two parameters within a single path segment, when the separator is not . (e.g. no /:a-:b). Alternatively, you can define the regex used for both parameters and ensure they do not overlap to allow backtracking.

References

🚨 path-to-regexp outputs backtracking regular expressions

Impact

A bad regular expression is generated any time you have two parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For example, /:a-:b.

Patches

For users of 0.1, upgrade to 0.1.10. All other users should upgrade to 8.0.0.

These versions add backtrack protection when a custom regex pattern is not provided:

They do not protect against vulnerable user supplied capture groups. Protecting against explicit user patterns is out of scope for old versions and not considered a vulnerability.

Version 7.1.0 can enable strict: true and get an error when the regular expression might be bad.

Version 8.0.0 removes the features that can cause a ReDoS.

Workarounds

All versions can be patched by providing a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a single segment. As long as the custom regular expression does not match the text before the parameter, you will be safe. For example, change /:a-:b to /:a-:b([^-/]+).

If paths cannot be rewritten and versions cannot be upgraded, another alternative is to limit the URL length. For example, halving the attack string improves performance by 4x faster.

Details

Using /:a-:b will produce the regular expression /^\/([^\/]+?)-([^\/]+?)\/?$/. This can be exploited by a path such as /a${'-a'.repeat(8_000)}/a. OWASP has a good example of why this occurs, but the TL;DR is the /a at the end ensures this route would never match but due to naive backtracking it will still attempt every combination of the :a-:b on the repeated 8,000 -a.

Because JavaScript is single threaded and regex matching runs on the main thread, poor performance will block the event loop and can lead to a DoS. In local benchmarks, exploiting the unsafe regex will result in performance that is over 1000x worse than the safe regex. In a more realistic environment using Express v4 and 10 concurrent connections, this translated to average latency of ~600ms vs 1ms.

References

Release Notes

0.1.12

Fixed

  • Improved backtracking protection for 0.1.x, will break some previously valid paths (see previous advisory: GHSA-9wv6-86v2-598j)

v0.1.11...v0.1.12

0.1.10

Fixed

  • Add backtrack protection to parameters 29b96b4
    • This will break some edge cases but should improve performance

v0.1.9...v0.1.10

0.1.9

Added

component/path-to-regexp@v0.1.8...v0.1.9

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ proxy-addr (indirect, 2.0.6 → 2.0.7) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.0.7

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Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ safe-buffer (indirect, 5.1.2 → 5.2.1) · Repo

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ send (indirect, 0.17.1 → 0.19.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 send vulnerable to template injection that can lead to XSS

Impact

passing untrusted user input - even after sanitizing it - to SendStream.redirect() may execute untrusted code

Patches

this issue is patched in send 0.19.0

Workarounds

users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched version of express, but otherwise can workaround this issue by making sure any untrusted inputs are safe, ideally by validating them against an explicit allowlist

Details

successful exploitation of this vector requires the following:

  1. The attacker MUST control the input to response.redirect()
  2. express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears
  3. the browser MUST NOT complete redirection before:
  4. the user MUST click on the link in the template
Release Notes

0.19.0

What's Changed

  • Remove link renderization in html while redirecting (#235)

New Contributors

Full Changelog: 0.18.0...0.19.0

0.18.0 (from changelog)

0.17.2 (from changelog)

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ serve-static (indirect, 1.14.1 → 1.16.2) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 serve-static vulnerable to template injection that can lead to XSS

Impact

passing untrusted user input - even after sanitizing it - to redirect() may execute untrusted code

Patches

this issue is patched in serve-static 1.16.0

Workarounds

users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched version of express, but otherwise can workaround this issue by making sure any untrusted inputs are safe, ideally by validating them against an explicit allowlist

Details

successful exploitation of this vector requires the following:

  1. The attacker MUST control the input to response.redirect()
  2. express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears
  3. the browser MUST NOT complete redirection before:
  4. the user MUST click on the link in the template
Release Notes

1.16.0

What's Changed

  • Remove link renderization in html while redirecting (#173)

New Contributors

Full Changelog: v1.15.0...1.16.0

1.15.0

1.14.2

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

🆕 call-bind (added, 1.0.8)

🆕 call-bind-apply-helpers (added, 1.0.0)

🆕 define-data-property (added, 1.1.4)

🆕 dunder-proto (added, 1.0.0)

🆕 es-define-property (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-errors (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 function-bind (added, 1.1.2)

🆕 get-intrinsic (added, 1.2.5)

🆕 gopd (added, 1.2.0)

🆕 has-property-descriptors (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 has-symbols (added, 1.1.0)

🆕 hasown (added, 2.0.2)

🆕 object-inspect (added, 1.13.3)

🆕 set-function-length (added, 1.2.2)

🆕 side-channel (added, 1.0.6)

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@depfu depfu bot added the depfu label Dec 7, 2024
@depfu depfu bot mentioned this pull request Dec 7, 2024
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